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Executive Summary 
In typical eProcurement processes, sensitive data such as prices, intellectual 
property, and customer information often flow across enterprise boundaries. Such 
sharing amplifies the risk of the data breach due to exposure to the potential security 
flaws of eProcurement partners. Threats of information leakage inhibit enterprises from 
sharing sensitive data; thus, enterprises cannot take full advantage of the eProcurement 
process. Existing cryptography-based data sharing protocols impose a high 
computational burden for maintaining data confidentiality in the procurement process. 
This additional burden makes existing cryptographic approaches unsuitable for real-time 
applications. With this motivation, we address the following research question: How can 
procurers and suppliers securely conduct their business transactions without revealing 
their confidential information? 
The technical approach for addressing the research question consists of 
developing foundational protocols for secure lightweight computations. The approach 
enables procurers and suppliers to perform computations while preserving their 
confidential information. In this report, we show how Computing-without-Revealing 
(CWR)-based data sharing protocols can be used as building blocks to execute 
auctions in the procurement process for standard products and innovative technologies. 
The design of a software embodiment of these protocols as a web-based platform is 
described. The platform is used to conduct experiments for measuring the performance 
of the developed protocols against competing techniques. Experimental results 
corroborate the efficiency of the developed protocols, making them suitable for real-time 
applications. The application of the protocols is demonstrated for different 
eProcurement scenarios, including first and second-price auctions for standard 
products. Pilot laboratory experiments were conducted to understand the behavioral 
implications of using these protocols in eProcurement scenarios. Results from the pilot 
experiment are discussed. 
Keywords: Secure multi-party computations, eProcurement, Auctions 
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Introduction 
The design and manufacturing of products, regardless of complexity, involve 
partnerships with third-party vendors, manufacturers, suppliers, contractors, and other 
entities outside the organization. The design of a Boeing 777 airplane, for example, 
involved over 10,000 people external to Boeing. Similarly, Ford Motor Company works 
with over 1,000 suppliers across the globe. Such partnerships allow organizations to 
focus on their core expertise, thereby increasing their effectiveness. However, there are 
also risks associated with sharing confidential information with business partners. In the 
2016 acquisition research symposium, it was highlighted that business partners pose a 
significant malicious threat because they are a part of the information flow (see Figure 
1). Therefore, there is a growing need for research and development on technologies 
that enable business transactions without revealing confidential information of the 
participants. 
Traditionally, business transactions between a procurer and suppliers involve a 
Trusted Third Party (TTP), say a cloud service provider. The procurer and suppliers 
send their confidential information to the TTP, who performs the required computation. 
Although this is easy to implement, the main risk is that rogue employees of the TTP 
(e.g., the people who maintain and update cloud servers) can learn the confidential 
information. Additionally, information may be compromised through a break-in by 
hackers, through a malware or spyware infestation, or even in a completely non-
malicious (i.e., accidental) manner. There is also a potential risk that the cloud service 
provider may, as an organization, decide to betray the users by revealing or secretly 
using their confidential inputs. A recent report from Ponemon highlighted the impact of 
internal attacks by insiders/contractors on organizations (see Figure 2). Therefore, it is 
important to preserve the confidentiality of an organization’s data while engaging with 
current and especially potential suppliers. 
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Figure 2.  Influence of different security threats faced by organizations [Ponemon 
2018] 
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In a typical eProcurement process, sensitive information related to prices, 
intellectual property, and customer data often flow across enterprise boundaries. While 
this data flow between eProcurement partners is important for performing business 
operations, there exist data security concerns, especially when the data involves 
intellectual property, trade secrets, etc. Sharing such confidential data amplifies the risk 
of data breach due to potential security flaws of the partners in the eProcurement 
process. Such threats discourage enterprises from sharing sensitive data and thus 
prevent these enterprises from taking full advantage of the eProcurement process. 
In this report, we present an approach for addressing this fundamental challenge. 
The approach enables secure eProcurement of standard products as well as innovative 
technology. We present the use of cryptographic protocols to execute auction 
mechanisms within an eProcurement process, where the procurer only learns 
confidential information related to winning bidders. No confidential information about the 
losing bidders is revealed to anyone, including the procurer, thereby resulting in truthful 
revelation and increasing value for all participants involved. This proposed 
eProcurement process promises economic advantages for a wide variety of private-
sector organizations ranging from large electronics manufacturers and automakers to 
small and medium-sized enterprises specializing in specific technologies.  
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Overview of the Approach 
Current procurement processes are characterized by incomplete and 
disaggregated information about (i) the capabilities and cost structure of individual 
suppliers and (ii) the requirements of the procurers. In a typical eProcurement process, 
such as a sealed-bid reverse auction as shown in Figure 3, procurement happens in 
three stages. In Stage 1, the procurer reveals his/her requirements to the suppliers. In 
Stage 2, suppliers submit their consolidated bids. In Stage 3, the procurer analyzes the 
submissions and determines the winner by choosing the supplier with the best 
technology at the lowest bidding price. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Existing approach for sealed-bid auctions 
 
In such a setting, suppliers would ideally like the procurer to learn their 
confidential cost information and the details of the proprietary technology only if they win 
the contract. However, procurers need to determine the quality and suitability of the 
technology to choose the winner. In addition, procurers may not want to reveal their 
requirements, especially if the requirements reveal their competitive advantage. This 
reluctance to reveal sensitive information may drive the procurer to settle for inferior 
solutions, thereby reducing the overall effectiveness of the procurement mechanism. 
This brings us to the research question addressed in this study:  How can procurers 
and suppliers securely conduct their business transactions without revealing their 
confidential information? 
Our central hypothesis for this project is that the fundamental protocols 
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involved in an eProcurement process. Computational results derived using Computing-
without-Revealing (CWR) protocols help in reducing information asymmetry while also 
protecting the sensitive information held by procurers and suppliers. Such an approach 
enables procurers and suppliers to estimate the challenges and uncertainties involved 
and thereby help both sides of the eProcurement process make informed decisions. In 
this section, we describe the roadmap of research activities that allow us to test our 
central hypothesis.  
Procurement processes based on the proposed CWR approach would enjoy the 
following benefits: 
 No cryptographic key management: No data is lost if the secret key used 
for determining the splits is inadvertently lost. 
 Computation time: The proposed protocols are computationally lightweight, 
unlike homomorphic encryption and circuit evaluation. Hence, it is possible to 
perform huge computations with weaker and battery-powered portable 
devices such as smart phones. 
 No data abuse: The data is handled by cloud servers, procurer(s), and 
supplier(s). In our approach, no user will know the actual inputs of their 
counterparts. Hence, there is no scope for misusing the data. Even if there is 
a breach in one of the cloud server(s), the data that a hacker can access 
would only be a share of the actual data.  
 No complex infrastructure required: Because their confidential information 
is protected, procurers and suppliers can use cloud services for procurement 
processes. This has cost advantages in terms of capital expenditure, IT 
expenses, etc. 
 Overcomes supplier vulnerabilities: The procurer need not worry about a 
data breach at the supplier’s end as the data breached (if any) at the vendor’s 
end will be only a share of the actual data. Therefore, no meaningful data 
would be leaked.  
 
A sub-field within cryptography called “secure multi-party computations” (SMC) 
focuses on enabling multiple parties to jointly process their individual confidential data 
into useful information while preserving the confidentiality of the data belonging to each 
party. Existing cryptographic practices to perform computations securely can be 
classified into two broad categories: 
1) No Need of a Third Party: Cryptographic techniques such as fully 
homomorphic encryption [Bogetoft et al. 2009], secure circuit evaluation [Ben-
Acquisition Research Program 
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David et al. 2008], and Partial Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) [Paillier, 1999] 
use encryption-based techniques to hide confidential data. Encrypted data is 
exchanged between parties and computations are performed on the 
exchanged encrypted data. Such computations impose a very high 
computational burden and the times reported using these techniques are 
much longer than in the case of the traditional TTP approach, which makes 
them ill-suited for use in practical scenarios. 
2) No Need to Reveal to the Third Party: On the other hand, using secret 
sharing techniques is a way to distribute a secret (or confidential data) among 
a group of parties, where every party is allocated a share of the secret. This 
secret can be reconstructed only when a sufficient number of shares are 
combined. Individual shares do not infer anything about the whole secret.  
 
Secret sharing approaches are comparatively faster than encryption-based 
secure computation techniques. However, the computational burden of these 
techniques is still considerably high. The cryptographic approach proposed in this study 
reduces the computational burden, which makes it easier to adapt. Moreover, as the 
proposed approach is based on general arithmetic primitives, it is well-suited for quickly 
building secure collaborative computing platforms for new procurement scenarios or for 
variants of the current state of practice, such as volume-based pricing, which is not 
handled in previous work.  
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Details of the Technical Approach 
eProcurement involves standard processes such as Request for Proposals 
(RFPs), auctions, payments, etc. Usually, these processes require inputs from both 
procurers and suppliers. We present a secure multi-party computation (SMC) technique 
that allows procurers and suppliers to perform the computations involved in these 
standard processes without needing to reveal their confidential inputs to anyone. We 
term our approach of the SMC technique as Computing-without-Revealing (CWR). It 
builds on the protocols developed by the PIs, which are presented in [Wang et al. 2017]. 
The approach is based on two key principles [Wang et al. 2013]: 
 Adding/multiplying an input with a random number hides the value of the 
input. If the random number is much larger than the input, it also hides the 
order of magnitude.  
 Adding/multiplying with a large number is orders of magnitude faster than the 
use of expensive cryptographic techniques such as homomorphic encryption 
and secure circuit evaluation. 
Consider a scenario where the confidential value is 11. We additively split the 
value into random-looking shares and a participating cloud server sees only one of the 
random-looking shares. For example, the additive splits of 11 could be 1819 and –1808 
(see Figure 4); it could just as well have been 103 and –92 or –19 and 30. These 
additively split values of 11 are stored in two different cloud servers. We developed 
protocols for basic arithmetic operations on such additive splits (see [Wang et al. 2017] 
for details).  
 
 





Confidential value : 11
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The CWR approach utilizes these splits to perform the desired computation 
without revealing the input data to anyone. In the next section, we review the existing 
CWR protocols.  
Foundational Computing-without-Revealing (CWR) protocols 
CWR protocols enable a procurer (referred to as Alice) and suppliers (referred to 
as Bob) to use a single external server (referred to as Helper) to perform the 
computations that are mutually agreed upon between Alice and Bob. The following is 
the generalized structure of the CWR protocols: 
Stage 1- Pre-processing of inputs: The pre-processing of inputs involves two 
steps:  
(a) Split the inputs additively if the inputs from Alice/Bob are not additive 
splits.  
(b) Alice/Bob agree on a morphing function and a distribution from which 
random numbers are generated. Alice/Bob morph the additive splits using 
this morphing function and random numbers from the distribution. These 
morphed additive splits prevent the Helper from learning about Alice/Bob 
when shared with the Helper.  
Stage 2- Run the desired computations securely: Alice/Bob derive the 
application logic from their mutually agreed computation. Alice/Bob provide the 
application logic along with the morphed additive splits to the Helper. The 
application logic involves the sequence of computations that need to be 
performed on the morphed additive splits. The output derived from running the 
application logic is additively split. One of the additive splits corresponding to the 
output is shared with Alice and the other with Bob. 
Stage 3- Post processing of outputs: Alice and Bob post-process their additive 
splits before sharing them with each other. Alice and Bob simultaneously 
exchange the processed outputs with each other. Alice and Bob independently 
add their additive splits and learn the actual output of the computation. 
Next, we present three existing CWR protocols: CWR-MP, CWR-GT0, and CWR-
VIP [Wang et al. 2017]. The first two protocols are focused on performing fundamental 
operations such as multiplication and greater than zero comparison. These foundational 
protocols have been utilized to develop higher level protocols including vector 
operations and matrix operations. We demonstrate this with CWR-VIP, which uses 
CWR-MP as a building block to securely perform a vector inner product operation.  
Acquisition Research Program 
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CWR Multiplication (CWR-MP) 
Protocol 1: CWR-MP 
Input: Alice’s (represented by A) input is V and Bob’s (represented by B) input is U.  
 
Output: A and B receive yA and yB respectively, where yA + yB = V*U. 
 
Stage 1-Pre-processing of inputs: 
Step 1: A additively splits her confidential value V into VA and VB such that V = VA 
+ VB. Similarly, B splits U into UA and UB. 
 
Step 2: AB : VB [Notation means A sends, to B, VB] 
 
Step 3: B A : UA 
 
Step 4: B A : s, H. A and B mutually agree on a seed (s) to generate a series 
of random numbers. A and B mutually agree on a helper server (H) to help them 
compute the product of their confidential values. A and B generate random 
numbers, r1, r2, r3, and r4, using seed (s). A uses a morphing function MA(x) = 
rix+ri+1 to transform her additive splits (VA and UA) into r1VA+r2 and r3UA+r4, 
respectively. Similarly, Bob uses morphing function MB(x) = rix-ri+1 to transform 
his additive splits (VB and UB) into r1VB-r2 and r3UB-r4, respectively. 
 
Stage 2- Run desired computations securely: 
Step 5: A H : r1VA+r2 , r1UA+r2 
 
Step 6: B H : r1VB-r2 , r1UB-r2 
 
Step 7: H: (r1VA+r2+ r1VB-r2) * (r3UA+r4+r3UB-r4) = r1 r3VU=P. Server splits P into 
PA and PB such that P = PA + PB.   
 
Stage 3-Post-processing of outputs: 









     
Correctness  








The inputs received by H are masked with  𝑟1 and 𝑟3. The product is masked with 𝑟1𝑟3. 
Alice receives UA and cannot determine (U) which is Bob’s input. Alice receives PA from 
H and cannot determine the product (VU) without PB . Similarly, Bob receives VB and 
cannot determine (V) which is Alice’s input. Bob receives PB from H and cannot 
determine the product (VU) without PA. 
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CWR Greater than Zero (CWR-GT0) 
Protocol 2: CWR-GT0 
Input: Alice’s (represented by A) input is V and Bob’s (represented by B) input is U.  
 
Output: A and B receive bA and bB respectively, where bA + bB = 1 if V>U and 0 else. 
 
Stage 1-Pre-processing of inputs 
Step 1: A additively splits her confidential value V into VA and VB such that V = VA 
+ VB. Similarly, B splits U into UA and UB. 
 
Step 2: AB : VB [Notation means A sends, to B, VB] 
 
Step 3: B A : UA 
 
Step 4: B A : s, H. A and B mutually agree on a seed (s) to generate a series 
of random numbers. A and B mutually agree on a helper server (H) to help them 
compute the product of their confidential values. A and B generate random 
numbers, r1, r2, r3, and r4, using seed (s). A uses a morphing function MA(x) = 
rix+ri+1 to transform her additive splits (VA and UA) into r1VA+r2 and r3UA+r4, 
respectively. Similarly, Bob uses morphing function MB(x) = rix-ri+1 to transform 
his additive splits (VB and UB) into r1VB-r2 and r3UB-r4, respectively. 
 
Stage 2- Run desired computations securely 
Step 5: A H : r1(VA- UA )+r2  
 
Step 6: B H : r1(VB- UB)-r2  
 
Step 7: H: if r1(VA- UA + VB- UB)>0 b = 1, else b = 0. Server splits b into bA and bB 
such that b = bA + bB.   
 
Stage 3-Post-processing of outputs: 
Step 8: H A : bA. If r1>0, Alice sets bA = bA else: bA = -bA 
 
Step 9: H B : bB. if r1>0, Bob sets bB = bB else: bB = 1-bB  
 
Correctness 
This can be verified by adding the splits held by A and B i.e. 𝑏𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵 = 1 if V>U else 0. 
Security 
The inputs received by H are masked with 𝑟1 and the output b is hidden with the sign of 
𝑟1. Alice and Bob receive only a split of their counterpart’s input which will not leak any 
information on the inputs. 
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CWR-Vector Inner Product (CWR-VIP) 
Protocol 3: CWR-VIP 
Input: Alice’s (represented by A) input is V and Bob’s (represented by B) input is U. Let 
the vectors V and U be of length n. 
 
Output: A and B receive yA and yB, respectively, where yA + yB = V.U. 
 
Stage 1-Pre-processing of inputs: 
Step 1: A additively splits her confidential value V into VA and VB such that V = 
VA + VB. Similarly, B splits U into UA and UB. 
 
Step 2: AB : VB [Notation means A sends, to B, VB] 
 
Step 3: B A : UA 
 
Step 4: B A : s, H. A and B mutually agree on a seed (s) to generate a series 
of random numbers. A and B mutually agree on a helper server (H) to help them 
compute the vector inner product of their confidential values. A and B generate 
4n random numbers using seed, s, to morph the additive splits (as described in 
Step 4 of CWR-MP). A morphs the elements in VA followed by UA using the 
morphing function MA(x) = rix+ri+1. Similarly, Bob uses morphing function MB(x) = 
rix-ri+1 to transform all the elements of (VB and UB) in the same order.  
 
Stage 2- Run desired computations securely 
Step 5: A and B run steps 5-7 of CWR-MP with the help of H for all the elements 
in VA. For this, the additive splits from A and B are (VA,i ,UA,i) and (VB,i ,UB,i), 
respectively. H stores the resulting outputs that belong to A and B in the ith 
position of vector PA and PB, respectively. 
 
Stage 3-Post-processing of outputs: 











      
Correctness 
This can be verified by adding the splits held by A and B i.e., 𝑦𝐴 + 𝑦𝐵 = 𝑉.𝑈 
Security 
The inputs received by H are masked with random numbers and the output is hidden 
within the product of random numbers. Alice and Bob receive only a split of their 
counterpart’s input which will not leak any information on the inputs.  
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Extension of CWR to eProcurement 
We investigated the different types of computations involved in a procurement 
process and learned that computations such as order statistics are very common in 
eProcurement processes. Existing CWR protocols that are aimed at computing 
arithmetic and logical operations can be constructed to perform order statistics, such as 
minimum. However, they are resource intensive. Therefore, we developed dedicated 
CWR protocols for computing order statistics such as minimum.  
New CWR protocols 
In this section, we present two dedicated CWR protocols (Protocol 4 and 
Protocol 5) for determining the minimum of confidential inputs in constant time. Protocol 
4 and Protocol 5 differ in terms of information that is known to the participants of the 
procurement process. Protocol 4 assumes that the participants are aware of the 
confidential inputs whereas Protocol 5 assumes that the participants of the procurement 
process know only an additive split of the confidential inputs. Note that Protocol 4 and 
Protocol 5 can be used for determining the maximum of the confidential inputs upon 
changing the sign of the inputs.  
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CWR-Minimum 
Protocol 4: CWR-Min 
Input: Alice’s (represented by A) input is a and Bob’s (represented by B) input is b.  
 
Output: A and B receive yA and yB, respectively, where yA + yB = min(a,b). 
 
Stage 1-Pre-processing of inputs: 
Step 1: Both A and B agree on the range and precision for their confidential 
values. For simplicity, let the range be denoted by [0, R] and precision be 
denoted by p. 
 
Step 2: A transforms her confidential input a into a vector V as follows:  
∏ 𝑣𝑖 = {





Similarly, B transforms his confidential input b into a vector U. 
 
Step 3: A additively splits the elements of her confidential vector into VA and VB 
such that V = VA + VB. Similarly, B splits U into UA and UB. 
 
Step 4: AB : VB [Notation means A sends, to B, VB] 
 
Step 5: B A : UA 
 
Stage 2- Run desired computations securely 
 
Step 6: A and B with the help of helper H perform Step 4 and Step 5 of the CWR-
VIP to compute the scalar product using their additive splits (VA, UA) and (VB, 
UB), respectively. At the end of this protocol, H stores the resulting PA and PB in 
the ith position of vector PA and PB.  
 
Stage 3-Post-processing of outputs 
Step 7: H A : PA. Alice computes similar to Step 6 of the CWR-VIP and 
multiplies with p to determine 𝑦𝐴 
 
Step 8: H B : PB. Bob computes similar to Step 7 of CWR-VIP and multiplies 
with p to determine 𝑦𝐵   
 
Correctness 
Upon converting a and b into vectors V and U, the one that is minimum between a and 
b will contain a greater number of zeroes. A scalar product between V and U would 
result in the minimum of a and b. 
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Security 
H cannot learn the inputs as they are masked with random numbers. In addition, H 
cannot learn the output, which is hidden within the product of random numbers. Alice 
and Bob receive only a split of their counterpart’s input, which cannot be used to leak 
any information on the inputs. 
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CWR-Min Splits 
Protocol 5: CWR-Min Splits 
Input: Alice’s (represented by A) input is (aA, bA) and Bob’s (represented by B) input is 
(aB, bB).  
 
Output: A and B receive yA and yB, respectively, where yA + yB = min(aA+ aB , bA +bB). 
 
Stage 1-Pre-processing of inputs 
Step 1: Both A and B agree on the range and precision for their confidential 
values. For simplicity, let the range be denoted by [0, R] and precision be 
denoted by p. 
 
Step 2: AB: 𝑿𝐴 ,  𝑿𝐵 . A and B mutually split the vector 𝑿 = [0, p,
2p … , ip , … ,
R
𝑝
] into 𝑿𝑨 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑿𝐵  such that 𝑿 = 𝑿𝑨 + 𝑿𝐵 .  
Stage 2- Run desired computations securely 
Step 3: A and B with the help of an external server as Helper (H) perform Steps 
5-7 of the CWR-GT0 protocol using (aA, aB) and additive splits of (𝑿𝐴 , 𝑿𝐵) as 
inputs and determine VA and VB.  
 
Step 4: Similarly, A and B with the help of H perform Steps 5-7 of the CWR-GT0 
protocol using (bA ,bB) and additive splits of (𝑿𝐴 , 𝑿𝐵) as inputs and determine 
vector UA and UB. 
 
Step 5: A and B with the help of H compute the scalar product using their additive 
splits (VA, UA) and (VB, UB), respectively, via Steps 5-7 of the CWR-MP protocol. 
At the end of this protocol, A and B receive yA and yB. Further, H stores the 
resulting PA and PB in the ith position of vectors PA and PB.  
 
Stage 3-Post-processing of outputs 
Step 6: H A : PA Alice computes similar to Step 6 of the CWR-VIP and 
multiplies with p to determine 𝑦𝐴. 
 
Step 7: H B : PB Bob computes similar to Step 7 of the CWR-VIP and multiplies 
with p to determine 𝑦𝐵.  
 
     
 
Correctness 
Upon converting a and b into vectors V and U, the one that is minimum among a and b 
will contain a greater number of zeroes. A scalar product between V and U would result 
in the minimum of a and b. 
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Security 
H cannot learn the inputs as they are masked by random numbers. In addition, H 
cannot learn the output, as it is hidden within the product of random numbers. Alice and 
Bob receive only a split of their counterpart’s input, which will not leak any information 
on the inputs. 
Our ultimate goal for this project is to test the feasibility of a procurement platform 
that enables participants of the procurement process to execute the computations 
involved without having to know the details of how the CWR technology operates. This 
allows procurers and suppliers to focus on designing a well-suited eProcurement 
process for their business needs. The research tasks performed to achieve this goal are 
as follows: 
1: Extension of CWR to auctions for standard products 
2: Extension of CWR to the procurement of innovative technology 
3: Performance analysis of CWR  
4: Influence of CWR on human behavior 
In the following sections, we describe these research tasks in detail.  
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Extension of CWR to auctions for standard products 
The objective in this research task was to extend CWR to eProcurement for 
standard products or commercial-off-the-shelf items. In other words, the quality of these 
types of products is established.  
While there are many ways to perform auctions within an eProcurement process 
for standard products, in what follows, we use reverse sealed-bid auctions to illustrate 
how CWR protocols can be used as building blocks to perform the computations 
involved (as shown in Figure 4). Note that the CWR-protocols can be constructed to 
perform the computations involved in any auction mechanism, but to simplify the 
discussion, we focus on the first price reverse sealed-bid auction. The computation 
involved in such auctions is the identification of a supplier with the minimum 
consolidated bid for all the items listed by the procurer. The procurer and suppliers 
mutually agree on three external servers (for example, cloud servers 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾). The 
procurer provides unique IDs to all the suppliers. Suppliers share the additive splits 
corresponding to their confidential information (i.e., consolidated bids) along with their 
IDs with cloud server 𝛼 and cloud server 𝛽. Cloud server 𝛼 (as Alice) and cloud server 𝛽 
(as Bob), together with cloud server 𝛾 (as Helper), deploy protocol 5. After protocol 5 
ends, the cloud servers 𝛼 and 𝛽 share the additive splits obtained with the procurer. By 
adding these additive splits, the procurer finds the supplier with the minimum 
consolidated bid and the value of the consolidated bid.   
This extension of CWR to eProcurement enables procurers and suppliers to 
perform procurement transactions without needing to reveal their confidential 
information to anyone. This allows procurers to design auction mechanisms that can 
help them overcome inefficiencies in existing auction mechanisms. For example, an 
auction mechanism built using CWR can identify the supplier with the best price (i.e., 
“cherry pick” the suppliers) for each and every item. Such an auction mechanism has 
great potential to reduce procurement costs, as the procurer gets the best possible price 
for every item. This will appeal to suppliers as well because their individual item prices 
are not revealed to anyone, including to the procurer. In this section, we present a CWR 
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first price reverse auction that enables the procurer to select the supplier who provides 
the greatest “bang for their buck” for each individual item and thereby overcome this 
inefficiency.  
CWR first price reverse auction 
In a CWR first price reverse auction, a single procurer (say, the DoD) can “cherry 
pick” the best supplier among the suppliers (DoD contractors) for each and every item. 
The CWR first price reverse auction is listed in Protocol 5.  
The CWR first price reverse auction enables the procurer to learn only the 
payments that need to be made to each individual supplier and the items provided by 
each supplier. Throughout the protocol, the procurer cannot learn the supplier’s 
individual item prices. Similarly, the supplier cannot learn the quantity desired by the 
procurer before the auction. The novelty in this protocol is that the external servers 
(cloud servers 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾) on which the CWR protocols are run do not know the 
auction’s context (item names, etc.) as they receive morphed additive splits. Therefore, 
the external servers learn nothing about the procurer’s/supplier’s confidential 
information. Note that this protocol is designed to choose the supplier based on a single 
attribute of the product (price). This protocol can be extended to multiple attributes with 




















Untrusted third party 
 
Figure 5.  CWR-first price reverse auction 
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Implementation details 
Below are some of the details for implementing the CWR first price reverse auction: 
 
1. Secure Channels: It is important to understand that information exchanges that 
occur between parties within the CWR auction should use secure channels, such 
as HTTPS. 
2. Cross Accounts: The ownership of the cloud server account is one of the 
concerns while deploying CWR. Existing cloud servers, such as Amazon Web 
Services (AWS), offer features such as cross accounts through which a procurer 
and suppliers can examine what algorithms are being run on their data splits. 
Please refer the webpage in this link 
(https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/tutorial_cross-account-with-
roles.html) for more details. 
3. Tie Breaks: There is a possibility that the item prices of suppliers may be the 
same. In such scenarios, the procurer can break such ties in many ways, 
including randomly picking a supplier from the suppliers with the same item price. 
How such ties are handled is made public to all participants prior to the auction. 
4. Single Item Winner: In some scenarios, a supplier may win only one item. This 
can reveal the item price to the procurer when he/she makes payments. In such 
scenarios, the corresponding supplier is informed and the supplier may choose to 
participate/quit the procurement process.  
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Protocol 6: CWR-first price reverse auction 
 
Input: Procurer provides the list of items (denoted by I) and their respective quantities 
(denoted by q = [q1, …, qN]). Suppliers (S1, …, SK) provide their item prices for the items 
in the list I. Supplier Sk item price list is denoted by pk = [pk1 , …, pkN]. 
 
Output: Procurer determines the items won (represented by wk) by each supplier Sk 
and payment (represented by ak).  
 
Stage 1-Pre-processing of inputs 
Step 1: The procurer and suppliers mutually identify cloud servers (𝛼 and 𝛽) as 
their surrogates to execute procurement using CWR. The procurer splits their 
sensitive information q into qα and qβ such that q = qα + qβ and shares them with 
the cloud servers 𝛼 and 𝛽, respectively. Similarly, the suppliers split their 
individual item price list and share them with the cloud servers 
𝛼 and 𝛽, respectively. 
 
Step 2: Cloud servers (𝛼 and 𝛽) mutually agree upon morphing functions (Mα, Mβ) 
and a seed to generate the random numbers that are used in these morphing 
functions. These agreements can be derived using session number, auction ID 
etc. Further, the cloud servers (𝛼 and 𝛽) identify another cloud server (𝛾) as their 
helper to perform the desired procurement computations using CWR.  
 
Stage 2- Run desired computations securely 
Step 3: Cloud servers (𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾) execute Steps 3-7 of CWR-Min followed by 
Steps 5-9 of CWR-MP for all the items listed in I. Cloud servers (𝛼 and 𝛽) keep 
track of the splits corresponding to the information on whether a supplier Sk 
won/lost the items (wαk = [wα1, …, wαN], wβk) and the splits corresponding to the 
payments that are to be made to the supplier Sk (aαk, aβk). The vector (wk = wαk + 
wβk) has 1s against the items that are won and 0s against all the items lost by the 
supplier Sk.  
 
Step 4: By the end of Step 3, cloud server 𝛼 has (aα = [ aα1, …, aαk], Wα = [ wα1, 
…, wαK]) and cloud server 𝛽 has (aβ, Wβ). Both cloud servers (𝛼 and 𝛽) share 
their splits with the procurer. The procurer adds (aα, aβ) to determine a = [a1, …, 
aK] where ak refers to the money that the procurer owes the supplier Sk. Similarly, 
the procurer adds (Wα, Wβ) to determine W = [w1, …, wK].  
 
Stage 3-Post-processing of outputs 
Step 5: Procurers provide the payment aK and items won (represented by wk) to 
Sk. Supplier Sk verifies the payment aK against the item prices that he/she won. 
      
 
Correctness  
The correctness is derived from the correctness of CWR-min and CWR-MP.  
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Security 
Procurer knows q, a, and W. With this information, the procurer cannot infer the 
suppliers’ item prices. Similarly, suppliers receive wk and the items they need to provide 
to the procurer. Additionally, the suppliers cannot infer each other’s private information 
such as item price. All the external servers (𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾) receive only one of the additive 
splits. However, these external servers learn the number of suppliers participating in the 
auction. This could be avoided by using different external servers for the computations. 
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Extension of CWR to procurement of innovative 
technology 
Procuring standard products are usually driven by price. However, while 
procuring innovative goods and services such as an aircraft, in addition to price, the 
quality of fit and performance characteristics of the supplied product should be 
evaluated to determine the winner. Usually, these products are also associated with 
confidential information such as intellectual property. This makes the procurement 
process for a non-standard product or development products complex.  
Information asymmetry that exists between the procurer and suppliers (say, DoD 
contractors), including product characteristics such as price and quality, inhibits the 
procurer and suppliers from fully understanding the relative importance between 
dimensions of quality and price. In this section, we describe how CWR protocols can be 
used in a procurement process so that the procurer and suppliers can reduce 
information asymmetry without any need to reveal their individual private information.  
Coughlan et al. [2008] proposed an iterated information aggregation auction 
(I2A2) for procuring products where the procurer does not have complete information on 
the dimensions of the product’s quality and their relative importance. Figure 6 shows the 
different stages in the I2A2 mechanism. This mechanism has two auction rounds (Stage 
2 and Stage 5). In Stage 2, the procurer collects information on the product’s quality 
from all the suppliers. Using this, the procurer estimates the relative importance of the 
quality dimensions in Stage 3. In Stage 4, the procurer eliminates suppliers with least-
value bids and in Stage 5, the remaining suppliers submit their final bid. In Stage 6, the 
procurer chooses the supplier with the highest value.  
 
Figure 6.  Iterated information aggregation auction (I2A2) mechanism [Coughlan et al. 
[2008]] 
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The I2A2 mechanism induces suppliers to truthfully reveal information about the 
procurer value and supplier cost. However, this mechanism favors the procurer alone. In 
the I2A2 mechanism, the suppliers lose ownership of their confidential information and 
have no control on how their information submitted in Stage 2 can be used by the 
procurer, apart from drawing an estimate of the relative importance of different 
dimensions of quality. In addition to this, the disclosed information is prone to risks such 
as information leak by a disgruntled employee in the procurer’s organization. Such risks 
need to be borne by suppliers without any guarantee of being awarded the contract. We 
address these concerns by performing the computations involved in Stages 2-5 of this 
procurement process using CWR protocols.  
CWR-I2A2 is a procurement process in which the procurer and suppliers mutually 
pre-agree on computations, including elimination criteria, and suppliers need not reveal 
any kind of confidential information until they are awarded the contract. CWR-I2A2 aims 
at deriving the aggregates while maintaining the privacy and the diffuse nature of 
information held with suppliers.  
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CWR-I2A2 
Protocol 7: CWR-I2A2 
Input: Procurer provides a list of dimensions for quality (denoted by D = [d1…,dN]) and 
his/her relative importance of the quality dimensions (denoted by U = [u1…,uN]). 
Suppliers (denoted by SK where k ∈ [1, 𝑘]) provide their item price (denoted by Pk) along 
with the weights (denoted by Wk = [w1,k…,wN,k]) against the dimensions of quality listed 
in D. Before the auction process begins, procurer discloses their elimination criteria 




𝑘=1  where, b𝑖,𝑘 

















Output: Procurer identifies the supplier SK who provides the highest value (P’K-VK.D). 
 
Stage 1-Pre-processing of inputs 
Step 1: Procurer and suppliers mutually identify cloud servers (𝛼 and 𝛽) as their 
surrogates to execute procurement using CWR. Procurer splits their sensitive 
information (D, U) into (Dα,Uα) and (Dβ,Uβ) such that D = Dα + Dβ and U = Uα + Uβ. 
Procurer shares (Dα,Uα) and (Dβ,Uβ) with cloud servers 𝛼 and β, respectively. 
Similarly, each supplier (Sk) splits their individual item prices Pk and weights Wk 
into (Pαk, Wαk) and (Pβk, Wβk) and shares them with cloud servers 𝛼 and 𝛽, 
respectively.  
 
Step 2: Cloud servers (𝛼 and 𝛽) mutually agree upon a seed to generate the 
required random numbers to morph the additive splits. This seed can be derived 
from session number etc. Further, the cloud servers 𝛼 and 𝛽 identify another 
cloud server (𝛾) as their helper to perform the desired procurement computations 
using CWR.  
 
Stage 2- Run desired computations securely 











−𝑊β𝑖,𝑘) and use cloud server (𝛾) to execute CWR-
GT0. By the end of this protocol, cloud servers (𝛼 and 𝛽) obtain the additive splits 
corresponding to b𝑖,𝑘. This step is repeated for all the quality dimensions and 
suppliers. Cloud servers (𝛼 and 𝛽) independently send the additive splits 
corresponding to b𝑖,𝑘values to the procurer, who determines the eligible suppliers 




𝑘=1   and informs the suppliers about the outcome. 
  
Step 4: The eligible suppliers reconsider their item prices Pk and weights Wk and 
revise their item price P’k and weights W’k, if needed. The eligible suppliers 
submit their additively split price P’k and weights W’k into (P’αk, W’αk) and (P’βk, 
W’βk). Cloud servers (𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾) together perform a CWR-first price reverse 
auction. By the end of this step, procurer receives (aα, aβ) from cloud servers 
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𝛼 and 𝛽, respectively. Procurer adds (aα, aβ) to determine a = [a1, …, aK] where ak 
refers to the money that the procurer owes the supplier Sk. Similarly, procurer 
adds (Wα, Wβ) to determine W = [w1, …, wK].  
 
Stage 3-Post-processing of outputs 
Step 5: Procurer provides the payment aK and items won (represented by wk) to 
Sk. Supplier Sk verifies the payment aK against the item prices that he/she won. 
 
Correctness 
The correctness is derived from CWR-first price reverse auction, CWR-min, and CWR-
MP.  
Security 
Procurer knows q, a, and W. With this information, procurer cannot infer suppliers’ item 
prices. Similarly, suppliers receive wk and the items they need to provide to the 
procurer. The suppliers cannot infer other suppliers’ private information, such as item 
price. All the external servers (𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾) receive only one of the additive splits of the 
confidential information. With this, external servers learn nothing.  
In the next section, we compare the performance of CWR-based computing techniques 
with competing secure computing techniques.  
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Performance Analysis of CWR 
We developed a test-bench to run and compare different secure computing 
techniques such as partial homomorphic encryption and secret sharing, as discussed in 
Section 2. In what follows, we describe the test bed developed as part of this project to 




Figure 7.  Experimental Setup 
 
We conducted experiments in two different settings. The first set of experiments 
was conducted when all the procurers and suppliers were connected to the same 
network (i.e., local area network or LAN). The second set of experiments was 
conducted when the procurers and suppliers were connected to different networks (i.e., 
wide area network or WAN). Note that the computation speed of all the approaches 
reduces with WAN. This is mainly attributed to the network latency. 
We identified computational time and bandwidth with respect to the amount of 
data that needs to be transferred between the procurer/suppliers as the key 
performance indicators (KPIs). The computational time is measured using a python 
module named “time” and the bandwidth is measured using an open source packet 
analyzer (Wireshark). We compared CWR protocols with competing secure computing 
techniques using these KPIs. 
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CWR-VIP: 
We chose the inner product as the computation to compare the performance of 
the proposed approach (CWR) against the existing approaches. This computation was 
chosen as it is commonly used to multiply the vector of quantity with the vector of item 
prices for the listed items within a procurement process.  
We found that the proposed approach (CWR) is at least 10 times faster than the 
best existing approach (refer Table 1) using LAN. We found that our approach is about 
7 times faster than the best existing approach (refer Table 2) using WAN. We realized 
that the cost of security (computational burden to maintain the confidentiality) in 
procurement activities is high (about 6-7 times) compared to open sharing, where 
procurement data is revealed to every participant. One of the reasons for this additional 
burden is because of the requirement of performing every computation using CWR 
protocols. In order to reduce this computational burden, we developed a standalone 
CWR-Min protocol for another commonly occurring operation: minimum.









10 14.6 4.1 0.35 
100 135.5 37.4 2.88 
1000 1738.4 378 27.5 
10000 >3600 4031 264.7 









10 16.5 5.58 0.68 
100 235 47.3 6.9 
1000 >3600 486.3 74.7 
10000 >3600 5567 742.6 
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In network communication, the amount of data (bandwidth) being exchanged 
between parties is another important performance indicator. In our comparative study, 
we found that our approach requires 3 times less bandwidth (refer Table 3). These 
results indicate that our approach can be deployed in real-time applications and can be 
supported by devices with limited battery power. 
Table 3.  Comparison of bandwidth use (in KB) 
  
CWR-first price reverse auction  
We developed the software embodiment of the CWR-first price reverse auction 
(described in Protocol 6) and used it as an auction mechanism in a procurement 
process. We used the values shown in Table 4 to simulate the auction mechanism. In 
what follows, we describe the outcomes of a traditional sealed bid auction and compare 
these outcomes with those obtained using CWR-first price reverse auction. 
In a traditional sealed-bid auction, the procurer reveals the desired quantity. The 
suppliers submit their respective sealed bids ($330, $322, $316) to the procurer, who 
selects the minimum bid ($316) in first price auction and receives the items from 
Supplier 3. Throughout the auction process, suppliers hide their item prices in the form 
of sealed bids. However, from Table 4, we learn that Supplier 3 does not provide the 
best prices for each individual item.  
 
Table 4.  Item prices and quantities used for simulation studies 








A 12 $11 $9 $10 
B 8 $6.5 $8 $7 
C 7 $8 $6 $6.5 








10 6.5 3.4 1.18 
100 61.8 33.8 10.6 
1000 614.2 342.7 105.9 
10000 >5000 3425.3 1053.7 
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Figure 8 shows a picture of the demo of this CWR-first price reverse auction, 
developed as part of this project. In this demo, one surface pro computer was used as 
the procurer and three other surface pros were used as the suppliers to simulate a 
reverse auction. All the surface pros were connected with each other using 2 Mbps 
(upload/download speed) LAN. The procurer and suppliers mutually agree on three 
external servers (𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾) which are used to run the CWR first price reverse auction. 
A computer is used to run these three external servers and this computer is also 
connected to all the surface pros using the same LAN.   
 
 
Figure 8. Demo of a CWR-first price reverse auction 
 
Deploying the CWR-first price reverse auction enables the procurer to enter item 
names and their respective quantities. Only the item names are provided to all the 
suppliers. Suppliers enter their respective confidential item prices (as listed in Table 4). 
As described in Protocol 6, the confidential information (item quantities and prices) is 
split additively and shared with the external servers (𝛼 and 𝛽). These external servers 
along with the help of another external server (𝛾) execute the computations involved in 
the auction. By the end of these computations, the procurer learns that items (A, C) and 
(B, D) will be provided by Supplier 2 and Supplier 1, respectively. The procurer also 
learns the amounts that should be paid to Supplier 1 and Supplier 2. The suppliers also 
receive information on the items they won/lost and their receivable payout amounts from 
the procurer. Figure 9 shows the screenshots of the procurer and suppliers at the end of 
the auction process. Note that throughout the procurement process, suppliers need not 
disclose their individual item prices to anyone. 
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This CWR-first price reverse auction enables procurers to select the suppliers 
who provide the best price for each individual item. Such selection enables the procurer 
to reduce procurement costs. For instance, using the values listed in Table 4, CWR-first 
price reverse auction enables the procurer to procure all the desired items for $292 
instead of $316 (from traditional sealed-bid auctions). We believe that this form of 
cherry-picking enables the procurer to increase competition among suppliers and 











Figure 9.  A screenshot of the procurer’s screen is shown in Figure 9 (a). 
Screenshots of the suppliers’ screens are shown in Figure 9 (b)-(d). 
 
We extended the functionality of this software embodiment to handle second-
price reverse auctions by modifying the calculation of payments in Step 3 of Protocol 6. 
We tested the scalability of the proposed CWR-first price reverse auction by running for 
different numbers of items procured by the procurer. The resulting computational time 
and bandwidth use are reported in Table 5 and 6, respectively. These results indicate 
that CWR-first price reverse auction is a computationally efficient and secure technique 
that can be deployed in real-time settings.  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 34 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 























        
The CWR-first price reverse auction is a step towards demonstrating that 
computations in a procurement process can be performed without needing to reveal any 
confidential information. We believe that procurers and suppliers can build on this and 





(CWR: First Price) (CWR: Second Price) 
4 7.8 7.2 
8 8.2 8.7 
16 9.2 9.5 
32 15.3 12.58 
64 18.95 18.41 
Number of 
items 
(CWR: First Price) (CWR: Second Price) 
4 0.05 0.06 
8 0.11 0.13 
16 0.21 0.22 
32 0.40 0.42 
64 0.76 0.82 
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Influence of CWR on human behavior 
We focused on the design of eProcurement auctions for standard products as the 
experimental setup to test the influence of protecting confidential information on the 
strategic behavior of humans (especially among suppliers). We used graduate students 
as suppliers and the virtual entity as the procurer for this experimental study, which 
provides a way to simulate information asymmetry among the suppliers. We conducted 
a pilot experiment with 10 subjects, all graduate students of the School of Mechanical 
Engineering at Purdue University.  
Experiment Task:  
In the experiment, every subject was an independent supplier who participated in 
20 different sequential first-price auctions, where the supplier with the least bid won and 
received the winning bid as a reward. In each auction, subjects competed to sell three 
products, one after other, in three periods. In every period, a subject competed against 
a single opponent. The cost of the product was constant for all three periods in an 
auction but varied across auctions. If a subject won with bid 𝑏𝑖 and cost of the product 𝑐 
in a period 𝑖, then the supplier’s profit was 𝑏𝑖 − 𝑐, and 0 if lost. Subjects were instructed 
to maximize their profit in every period. 
Experimental Treatments: 
Four treatments were implemented by varying the policy about winning bid 
revelation and varying the cost of the product (see Table 7). The two revelation policies 
were: i) reveal the winning bid (R), and ii) do not reveal the winning bid (NR). The two 
supplier cost types were: i) low cost of the product (LC), and ii) high cost of the product 
(HC). Every subject completed five sequential first-price procurement auctions in each 
of the four treatments. Two subjects, one each of low-cost and high-cost types, were 
randomly grouped for competing in an auction to avoid collaboration and group 
strategies.  
Figure 10 shows the user interface used for the experimental task. Subjects 
could see their previous bids and cost at any given time. Winning bids were reported 
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based on the auction type. For representation purposes, the bids were reported both 
numerically in a table and graphically in a plot. 
 
Table 7.  Experiment treatments and the number of auctions in each treatment. 
 
Winning Bid Revealed 
(R) 
Winning Bid not 
Revealed (NR) 


















Figure 11.  Bid to cost ratio for winners and losers in respective periods. 
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Figure 11 summarizes the results as subjects’ bid to cost ratio (
𝑏𝑖
𝑐
) for three 
periods in each of the four treatments. The most common strategy of winners was to 
increase their bids for the next period, while that of losing subjects was to decrease 
bids. Given that low-cost type subjects were at an advantage to bid smaller values over 
high-cost type subjects, the winner group included mainly low-cost type subjects. In 
treatment R, low-cost type subjects were able to identify the high-cost values in 
respective auctions. Consequently, the average bid to cost ratio for winning low-cost 
type subjects was 1.1, which equaled the high-cost to the low-cost ratio.  
We observe that inflation of bids relative to the cost of the product by winning 
subjects is higher in NR treatment (when winning bids are not revealed) than R 
treatment (when winning bids are revealed). We ran a two-sided t-test between bid 
inflation by winners of period 2 (𝑏3/𝑐 − 𝑏2/𝑐) in R treatment and that in NR treatment. 
We observe that bid inflation is larger in NR treatment with t-statistic and p-value 
respectively equal to 2.41 and 0.017. For only low-cost type subjects, t-statistic and p-
value values of the same two-sided t-test are 2.88 and 0.005 respectively. 
With two players and constant cost in sequential first-price auctions, winning bids 
are higher in non-revelation of winning bids than when winning bids are revealed. In 
contrast, high-cost suppliers have better chances of winning with non-revelation of 
winning bids because their cost is protected and low-cost suppliers will likely inflate their 
bids. Although our results suggest that revelation of winning bids is beneficial from a 
buyer’s perspective, the results may change with a larger number of players, or with 
consideration of quality of the product. Further controlled experiments need to be 
conducted to analyze the behavioral implications of such settings. 
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Summary 
The proposed approach, Computing-without-Revealing (CWR), supports 
research in information systems and risk management. Our approach also 
complements, but does not replace, research in economic mechanism design. While 
mechanism design is focused on truthful revelation through the design of incentives, our 
approach focuses on protecting confidential information in any mechanism. In this 
study, we developed new dedicated CWR protocols suited for eProcurement and 
demonstrated the application of these protocols for the procurement of standard and 
innovative products.  
We proposed the CWR-first price reverse auction, which enables a procurer to 
“cherry pick” those suppliers who provide the best price for each individual item and 
thereby lower procurement costs. Such lowering of acquisition costs for procurers will 
increase their efficiency because they will be able to achieve more with the same 
financial resources. Suppliers who participate will not see their competitive advantage 
erode due to the very fact that they participated (e.g., currently, a cost advantage for 
some components quickly erodes once it becomes known). The eProcurement 
platforms based on the proposed approach will considerably mitigate the threat of data 
breach originating from business partners because the approach makes it possible to 
achieve the desired collaborative goals with business partners without revealing to them 
the confidential data on which the collaboration depends.  
A test bed was developed to compare the performance of CWR-based protocols 
with the previous-best approaches. Experimental results show that the CWR protocols 
performed better than previous-best approaches. With this, we conclude that CWR 
based auctions are lightweight, scalable, and secure.   
Finally, we performed a pilot laboratory experiment to understand the behavioral 
implications of using CWR in an online auction. From the pilot study, we observed that 
subjects increase their bids based on whether they win in past auctions. Such bid 
inflation behavior is influenced by hiding the outcomes of the auctions. Further studies 
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